Using a calibrated OLG model with several sources of uncertainty we find that the impact of ageing and of reform of social security upon the demand for housing and the level of owner occupation is substantial. The overall structure of household asset holdings -in particular the split between real and financial assets -is sensitive to demographics and to the generosity of state run, pay-as-yougo pensions. The interaction between social security reform and housing market conditions is significant and suggests that any changes in pension rules will have substantial knock on effects on the housing market.
Introduction
This paper explores the link between housing markets and the portfolio allocation of households in a world of changing demographics and shifting pension arrangements. We investigate optimal decisions over saving, portfolio allocation and housing tenure in an environment where there are several assets to choose from, options to rent or buy a house and where there are multiple sources of uncertainty. Several stochastic, calibrated models have studied the impact of uncertainty both in incomes of individual households (which is largely idiosyncratic) and in the rates of returns on some assets on life cycle choices. Very few models, however, allow for the special role of housing in the economy; one exception is Cocco (2000) . The main aim of this paper is to introduce housing into households' consumption-savings decisions. We embed the decision making of individual households within a model of overlapping generations to derive aggregate demand for various asset classes, allowing for feedbacks from demand changes onto house prices. We calibrate the model so that it broadly reflects features of the UK economy. We then use the model to assess how changing demographics and their interaction with pension reform can generate changes in savings, portfolio allocation, the overall demand for housing and the choice of housing tenure between ownership and renting.
It is very likely that the links between housing, shifting demographics and changes in the structure of state pensions are of great economic significance. Other net financial assets are about 7% of net worth. The value of accrued claims to future government unfunded pensions (both state pensions and promises to public sector workers) make up about 25% of net household wealth. The scale of knock-on effects on portfolio allocation of demographic changes and shifts in pension arrangements is likely to be large. And because houses are hardly traded internationally -unlike claims on financial assets -the scope for induced impacts upon house values and rents is also large.
But little analysis of the scale of these effects exists.
Using a standard OLG model with several sources of uncertainty we find that the impact of ageing and of reform of social security upon the demand for housing and the level of owner occupation is substantial. The overall structure of household asset holdings -in particular the split between real and financial assets -is sensitive to demographics and to the generosity of state run, pay-as-you-go pensions. The interaction between social security reform and housing market conditions is significant and suggests that any changes in pension rules will have substantial knock-on effects on the housing market.
Related literature
In the wake of the seminal work of Auerbach All these models study the impact of uncertainty both in incomes of individual households (which is largely idiosyncratic) and of the rates of returns on some assets, but they do not allow for the special role of housing in the economy. Housing is an important asset in the portfolio of wealth of most developed economies. We calibrate our model to match features of the UK economy. The UK has a level of owner occupation of just under 70% -a level that is about average across developed economies. The total value of owner occupied housing in the UK economy in 2003 was around three times GDP and greater than the gross value of financial assets held by the household sector. The importance of housing in UK household balance sheets is not unusual -across most economies the value of residential property is greater than the value of net financial assets. Housing not only comprises a very large proportion of the net worth of households it is also a unique asset. Housing is a durable good which yields a substantial flow of real benefits to its owner -the implied value of owner occupation. It can also -and certainly in the UK has fairly consistently in the past forty years -generate real capital gains. Houses and appartments are also one of the few forms of wealth where the scope to borrow against the asset as collateral is significant. Clearly the characteristics of residential property are very different from equity investments and from investments in bonds or in cash.
We introduce housing into a calibrated OLG model in a way that allows for all the peculiar features of housing. We pay particular attention to: the volatility and uncertainty over house prices; the scope to borrow against housing as collateral; and to the role that housing services play in enhancing the utility of owner-occupiers.
We first develop a model designed to allow us to investigate how demographic change and the evolution of social security will impact portfolio holdings and housing choices for different generations. The key features of the calibrated model are that it allows for: (a) uncertainty over individual incomes, (b) stochastic rates of return on risky assets and for house prices, (c) a pay-as-you-go pension system with pensions partly linked to incomes and which are also partly flat rate, (d) some scope for households to borrow for house purchase, (e) a rented sector providing an alternative to owner occupation, (f) a bequest motive.
We calibrate the model so that it generates results which broadly match some (but not all) key features of households' decisions on saving, borrowing and housing choices (renting versus owner-occupation and the size of the house or apartment). We then use it to explore the impact of various policy changes upon portfolio choices, upon the demand for housing and upon the stock of wealth held by households, both within and between generations.
In the next section we describe the model structure. We then begin our description of the simulation results by focusing on results for existing households at a set of parameters that represents a stylized version of the economy. We look at household and aggregate results. We then look at alternative scenarios for the future where two types of pension reform are considered. These are:
1. Reductions in the generosity of the state pension on a scale to keep the budgetbalancing contribution rate constant (which requires a gradual fall in the average replacement rate from around 30% in 2004 to under 20% by 2050) 2. A gradual but persistent rise in the retirement age -or the age at which the pay as you go pension is received.
The Model of Household Choices
Households enter the model at age 20 and do not survive beyond the age of 90. To simplify the notation t = 0 corresponds to the age of 20 and T = 70 corresponds to the age of 90 when all households still alive die with certainty. We assume that households are rational, forward-looking and solve a stochastic dynamic programming problem. They receive utility from consumption of goods, and from consumption of housing services.
We assume that households make choices in each period of their lives about:
(a) how much to spend on consumption (C t ), (b) whether to own a property or to rent (α
(c) what size of property to live in (H t ), (d) how to allocate financial wealth between safe assets (cash, denoted by B t ) and risky assets ("equity", denoted by S t ) where the latter are unpredictable but, on average, have a higher return, (e) how much to borrow (D t ) against ownership of property (which is the only means to acquire debt and then is subject to various limits).
We assume there is a bequest motive. The assumption made about bequests is an important one in any model of saving and portfolio allocation. The impacts of reform to pay-as-you-go pension systems and the holding of residential property are likely to be sensitive to whether households have a bequest motive. How important bequests are, relative to life cycle smoothing motives, in accounting for overall levels of wealth holdings is controversial. Even in economies like Japan -where savings rates have been high and family bonds between generations are seen as strong -the bequest motive may not actually be very strong. Recent work of Horioka (2001) suggests that the bequest motive in Japan may be relatively weak. A survey of motives for saving undertaken by the Central Council for Financial Services (Bank of Japan) showed that under 4% of those surveyed listed bequests as a motive for saving (2003 fiscal year). It is not plausible that in the UK -where the household savings rate has been very much lower -the bequest motive is much higher than in Japan. So there is some justification for assuming that there is a relatively weak bequest motive. (Accidental bequests will, however, naturally arise in a model where annuities markets are less than perfect or where households have an incentive to own their own home while elderly. We find that if we assume that annuities markets are imperfect unintended bequests are important). So while we allow for a bequest motive we set it at a fairly modest level in the main simulations.
Households earn labour income y t up to an exogenously given retirement age T R .
Labour income consists of a deterministic componentȳ t , which is augmented by a stochastic element. The impact of stochastic shocks is persistent. In retirement agents rely upon accumulated savings and a state pension whose value depends partly on the salary earned at the end of the working life. We will set the tax rate levied upon labour earnings to balance the state pension system and will not allow deficit financing. Clearly, this is a very highly simplified version of the tax benefit system.
Preferences
The household utility maximization problem is given by
The control variables and the budget constraint are detailed in the next subsection. V t is the value function at time t, δ is a constant time discount factor and l t is the probability of surviving period t, thus (1 − l t ) represents the probability of dying in period t. T is the last possible period of life (or maximum age to which one can live), so that l T = 0.
B(w t+1 ) is a bequest function -a household receives utility from the knowledge that if they die during period t their heir receives wealth w t+1 . U (C t , H t ) is a felicity function defined by
We allow for the preference for consumption to depend on the age of the householdthis is reflected by the McClement's equivalence scale m t . The reciprocal of η is the elasticity of substitution between housing and consumption of goods. This elasticity of substitution is different from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, γ −1 . With these preferences γ also reflects risk aversion. κ and ξ are parameters reflecting the relative value of housing and consumption in the utility function. We will set these parameters so that the simulation results give a broadly plausible pattern of household decisions over the life cycle. With this standard time-separable expected utility model, the value function can be reformulated as
The budget constraint
The value of labour income plus net assets at the start of a period t (including ownership of housing from the previous period) is denoted by x t -this is a comprehensive measure of current net wealth after receipt of labour income for the period ahead. If a households buys a property there is the option to borrow an amount up to a maximum level which we allow to depend on the value of the owned house. If the household rents it pays rent which is the product of the rental yield r H t and the value of the house. Denote the price per unit of housing by p t , then the house value is equal to p t H t . After deciding about the level of consumption C t , the size of the house H t , mortgage D t and safe investment B t the amount of risky investment S t is defined by one of two conditions depending on whether the household owns (α H t = 1 ) or rents (α H t = 0).
All choice variables must be nonnegative (C t , H t , B t , D t ≥ 0), so the condition S t ≥ 0 naturally forms the budget constraint.
Wealth held by a household consists of two parts: financial wealth w F t and housing wealth w
Financial wealth includes both safe assets and risky assets (which we can think of as equity) and is net of debt
R is the stochastic real rate of return on risky assets (which we call "equities"). In this model we allow for differential real interest rate on borrowing -r B t and savingsr t ; specifically we assume that the interest charged on mortgage loans is 5% whereas risk-free deposits earn interest of 2.5%. Because of the difference in rates households will not simultaneously hold debt and safe assets; if D t > 0 for a household it will not hold safe assets (B t = 0) and if B t > 0 it will not have a mortgage (D t = 0). Investment in housing (or housing wealth) is defined as
Housing wealth equals zero only when the household is renting ¡ α
. All in all, the dynamics of net worth is determined by the value of risky and non-risky investments, net of debt, plus the value of housing, current labour income and the amount of bequest received by the household
The availability of credit
The borrowing capacity of a household is based on labour income and the value of collateral (the house or appartment). We assume that debt can be no greater than a fraction (λ H ) of the value of the house and debt repayments can be no larger than a given fraction (λ y ) of income. Debt repayments assume that borrowing is in the form of a 25 year fixed term repayment (i.e. amortising) mortgage. Debt must be repaid by retirement; the number of remaining years over which debt is to be repaid is denoted
Thus, the maximum amount the household can borrow is defined as
In setting λ H < 1 we assume that the fraction of a house financed from saving can be no less than a given percentage. We take that percentage to be 30% until 1981 after which, as a result of financial liberalisation, it falls gradually over a ten year period to 10% (in other words the maximum loan to value ratio, λ H , rises from 70% to 90% between the start of the 1980's and the end of the 1980's -which is roughly in line with the UK experience). We assume that since 1991 households can spend up to 25% of the annual labour income on mortgage repayment (λ y = 0.25); before 1980 we set that ratio lower, at 17.5%, to reflect the rise in the availability of credit which occurred in the 1980's due to mortgage market liberalisation. The interest charged on mortgage loans is set to r B = 5%.
Bequest motive
Bequeathable wealth is defined as the sum of financial and housing wealth -w t . It is always non-negative as the amount of borrowed funds are always collateralized by the value of property. The bequest function is
where the parametersξ 1 andξ 2 reflect the strength of the bequest motive. Whenξ 2 = 0 there is no bequest motive, i.e. B (w t ) is independent of w t . We set the bequest motive at a moderate level:ξ 1 = 0.1,ξ 2 = 1. Thus the utility from a bequest depends on
Although we use a model with a relatively weak bequest motive this does not imply that bequests are unimportant. In this model there are no annuities and as a result there can be significant unintended bequests. (In fact we find that a large proportion of bequests are indeed unintended.)
Labour income and state pension
Pre-tax labour income y t is the product of an underlying deterministic trendȳ t and a stochastic component. The deterministic part is a function of age and it is calibrated to reflect the average lifetime earnings profile in the UK, peaking at the age of 50 at about twice the salary of a 20-year old (see Miles 1997) . The deterministic profile also accounts for productivity growth -productivity is assumed to grow at rate g P . The random component of income reflects idiosyncratic, persistent income shocks u t :
We set ρ u = 0.98, σ u = 0.11, numbers which reflect the degree of volatility of UK labour incomes and the degree of persistence of shocks (Miles 1997) .
State pension income is a combination of a final salary related component and a flat rate component. The flat rate component is defined as a fixed proportion θ of average retirement salary,ȳ T R exp (σ 2 u /2) . On average it makes up 2/3 of the pension; the rest is the salary related component which is agent specific. For t > T R pension income y t is equal to
where the average replacement rate θ of the pension is set to be around 30%. Every year pension income is adjusted for productivity growth g P . Pension income is assumed to be tax-free.
Equity and safe returns
Equity returns are log-normal i.i.d:
R = 1.065, σ r = 0.175.
We take the mean return on risky assets (equities) to be 6.5% and annual volatility to be 17.5%. The real rate of return on a safe asset is 2.5% p.a. We assume these return processes are invariant to domestic saving and portfolio choice. This is in contrast to the assumption about house prices and rental yields, where changes in aggregate demand are allowed to influence the house price process and the rental rate, respectively. This seems a natural set of assumptions to make for a model calibrated to a relatively small open economy like the UK. UK households and financial institutions can access global capital markets; but houses are non-traded goods, specific to the UK and construction is subject to planning restrictions which limit supply.
House price process and rental yield
We assume that the price of any particular house consists of two components: an overall, aggregate average house pricep t and an idiosyncratic (house specific) element. Log house prices p t , relative to the average price, follow a mean reverting process
The shocks ε p t are independent, normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ p .
We set the initial rental yield r H to 4.0%, a figure consistent with the average net of costs yield to owners of rental property in the UK in recent years. (We also allow for the yield to depend on the demand for rental properties in a way we describe below).p t is the equilibrium price of a unit of housing and we obtain it as the price which clears housing market at given time t. The modelling of aggregate housing demand and supply depends on population structure and on the elasticity of supply . This is described in greater detail in Section 3.3 after we have discussed how the population structure evolves.
The Overlapping Generations Model
To analyze the impact of various public pension policies we embed the household decision model within an overlapping generations model. All households that are born at time s belong to the same cohort s. These households have common deterministic labour income profileȳ t and average house price profilep t , but are each subjected to different idiosyncratic income shocks u t , house price shocks ε p t and risky returnsR t . Households in different cohorts have different average incomes because of productivity growth 1 , and will face a different lifetime profile of average house prices.
We proceed by describing the demographics first, followed by the structure of cohorts and the transfer of bequests amongst them. We then describe how we calculate aggregate housing demand and equilibrium in the housing market.
Demographics and tax
Let us denote by N t (s) the number of individuals aged t years at time s. Denote the retirement age at time s by T R s . Assuming that productivity (i.e. labour income) in the economy grows at constant rate g P , the income adjusted support ratio S y (s) is defined as
S y (s) at any time s describes the ratio between the amount of money earned by the working population and the amount of money received by pensioners in a scheme with a 100% average replacement rate. In other words, the denominator represents the pension 1 The average labour income of cohort s + 1 is higher than that of cohort s by the factor exp (g p ) .
bill should every pensioner be given an average last-period-at-work salary adjusted for productivity growth, cf. equation (13) .
The pension system is balanced by setting the labour income tax rate τ (s) at the level where tax receipts in a given year exactly match the pension liabilities
where θ (s) is the average replacement rate in period s. This calculation reflects the changing demographic structure, characterized by N t (s) . The number of households of each age are based on UK government actuaries projections of the UK population.
In the year 2000 the income adjusted support rate is 3.65, which implies the labour income tax required to support the replacement rate of 30% is 8.2%; this rate increases approximately by a factor of 1.6 by 2050 if pensions remain equally generous relative to income.
Transfer of wealth among generations
We assume that wealth held by households at the time of their death is inherited by younger generations. The amount of bequeathable wealth w t is equal to the sum of net financial wealth and the value of owner occupied house. For simplicity, we assume that bequests are passed onto the generation which is born T B years later than the parent cohort. To eliminate the need for the amount of received bequests to become another state variable we simplify the bequest transfers by assuming that bequests are redistributed evenly across the younger cohort.
The redistribution of bequests works as follows. Letw t (s) be the average bequest left by household aged t in cohort s. Then, the average flow of bequests generated by cohort s over its lifetime is given bȳ
where l t is the probability of surviving one year at age t. To calculate the bequest distributionb t (s) in (18) we run Monte Carlo simulations of income processes, house prices and risky returns and observe the households' holding of wealth. Using this data we calculate the averagew t (s) and substitute this result into equation (18) . 
Therefore, at date s the bequests are balanced as follows
bequests received at time s
where the term before last is the amount of bequests which is added to the stock of accumulated bequests (which are to be distributed later when the appropriate cohort enters the model) and the last term is the amount of bequests distributed among current 20-year-olds but accumulated in previous years 2 . The bequest span T B is set at 30 years.
House price equilibrium
To calculate housing demand in a given year s we need to compute the optimal demand for housing services of all cohorts alive in that year, i.e. cohorts s, s − 1, ..., s − T + 1. We use a large number of realizations of income shocks and idiosyncratic house price shocks at the household level to calculate individual demands for housing for many households of different ages at each point in time. Let us denote the average housing demand of 2 Note that at any time s the total amount of accumulated bequests is
households of age t in cohort s byH t (s). Then the aggregate housing demandH D (s)
at time s is formed by summing demand across all households alive in that period
In the overlapping generations model we calculate the aggregation from year 1990 until 2110. Using the aggregate housing demand we calculate house demand growth as
We then calculate what the aggregate growth in house supply is each period based on an assumed price elasticity of supply of 0.5 -a figure which is the average of all the estimates of UK housing supply elasticity reported by Barker (2004) . For the historical periods (up to 1990) we set the growth rate of average house prices equal to the actual average long term real house price growth in the UK (since 1945) of about 2% a year.
For the simulation period (1990-2110) we set the average growth rate of real prices each period at a level which matches the change in aggregate demand to the aggregate change in supply, based on the assumed supply elasticity. For the periods after 2110 we approximate the subsequent house price growth by the growth rate observed in 2110.
Searching for equilibrium house price requires an iterative procedure. In every iteration we solve the household optimization problems with the time profile of average house prices that would have cleared the market demand in the previous iteration. We iterate to a fixed point where the growths in aggregate demand and in aggregate supply match, assuming a price elasticity of 0.5 in each period.
We assume that there is a less than perfectly elastic supply of rental properties at any house price level. We assume that a 1% increase in the demand for rental housing raises the rental yield by 1/50 of 1%. So a 50% rise in the demand for rental property would, in addition to any impact on house prices from any associated increase in the overall demand for residential property, also have an effect on the relative price of rental to owner occupied property by raising the rental yield by 1% (from an initial level at the start of the simulation period set to 4%).
The stylized facts to match with the calibrated model
The key features of the current UK housing market 3 that we aim to replicate with the calibrated OLG model are::
1. Owner occupation. The overall owner occupation rate has been very steady at around 68% for the past 10 years. Owner occupation is relatively low amongst people in their 20's and starts to rise strongly amongst people in their 30's. Owner occupation is much higher amongst those in the second half of their working lives.
The average age at which people became home owners in 2003 was around 32. the spread between deposit and mortgage rates is likely to be about 2.5%.
Borrowing limits (down-payment requirement).
In recent years the typical loan to value ratio of first time buyers in the UK is between 85% and 95%. A down payment of somewhere between 10% and 15% of the property is now common. At times in the past this down payment requirement has been higher. 7. Financial assets and savings. As well as trying to reflect the nature of household ownership of residential property, we also want to capture other key aspects of household decisions: the saving rate and the split between safe and risky assets.
In this model the saving rate should be thought of as the net national saving rate (since neither corporations, who implicitly are assumed to distribute all income, nor government, who run balanced budgets, do any saving).
We chose the three key preference parameters to try to reflect these aspects of behaviour. We set the risk aversion parameter, γ, equal to 4. We set the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing, 1/η, equal to 2/3. We set the discount factor, δ, to 0.99.
Parameters of the base case model are summarized in Table 1 .
Simulation Results
We take the calibrated model and use numerical methods to work out optimal decisions at different ages as a function of the state variables (age, current labour income, wealth, house prices). This is a formidable task since we have a four dimensional state space and many sources of uncertainty requiring a large amount of numerical integration. In addition, to solve the first order conditions at each of several thousand nodes requires finding roots of four non-linear simultaneous equations (which are the first order condi-tions) as a function of four control variables (goods consumption, house size, buy/rent decision, financial portfolio choice).
Having solved the model at a grid of points in the state space we then take 100,000
households and use Monte Carlo methods to follow their optimal decisions over the life cycle. For each household we take a draw from a distribution of the stochastic elements of house prices, incomes and rates of return in every period of the household's life. We use the optimal solution at the points of the grid in the state space to estimate the best decision for each household for any point in the state space. This involves interpolating between points in the four dimensional grid of the state space. Once we have solutions for 100,000 households we can average all the decisions made by households at a particular age to show cohort behaviour, or aggregate across all households to show macroeconomic outcomes.
We present three sets of results. In the first two simulations (scenarios A and B) the retirement age is kept constant at 62; in the third simulation it increases from 62 in 2015 to 70 in 2050. In the first set of results (scenario A) we assume that the generosity of the PAYGO pension remains constant; the replacement rate averages 30% for every cohort.
(The replacement rate is not the same for those within a cohort because there is a flat rate element to the pension which generates some redistribution within the system). In the second set of simulations (scenario B) we assume that the level of the state pension is gradually reduced so that the contribution rate needed to balance the state pension system is constant at 8.2%. In this scenario the average replacement rate of the state pension falls from 30% to about 19% by 2050. In the third simulation (scenario C) we allow for a continuing rise in the retirement age which helps to reduce the tax burden, but we assume a constant pension generosity (replacement rate of 30% on average).
We begin by focusing on the behavior of a particular cohort (that born in 1960) in Younger households aim to move into owner occupation fairly early in their life cycle and the great majority remain in owner occupation until well into retirement. Because the typical household can expect to stay in owner occupation for many years owning a home gives a form of insurance against unexpected house price shocks. Since these shocks are large there is an element of a precautionary demand for housing. As a result owner occupation is very high within a cohort once the age of its members is above 40; figure   3 shows that owner occupation is close to 80% at age 50 and peaks at just under 90% at retirement. Owner occupation rates fall slightly as households move through their 60' and their 70's. Owner occupation amongst those households in their 80's -and for whom the desired stock of net worth begins to fall significantly -starts to drop rapidly.
Initially almost all households borrow as much as they can to finance house purchase.
But during their 40's there emerges considerable heterogeneity within the cohort with many households borrowing substantially less than the maximum. All this matches the key features of household choices in the UK.
Once households retire there is a significant change in the portfolio of assets. The existence of a bequest motive means that while many households wish to continue holding substantial net assets the composition of portfolios changes. Increasingly households reduce the proportion of their overall wealth in the form of owner occupied housing and increase the proportion of wealth in the form of financial assets. As households go past retirement the composition of their financial assets changes rapidly as people increase sharply the percentage of their assets in safe debt and holdings of risky assets fall sharply.
In contrast very few households in their 30's and 40's hold significant amounts of wealth in safe financial assets. When human capital is still the dominant form of lifetime assets, and when holdings of debt (which has a cost in excess of the return on safe assets) tend to be large, holding safe assets is not attractive; where financial assets are held they are therefore overwhelmingly in the form of risky assets. This is a reflection of the assumption that shocks to human capital are largely idiosyncratic and independent of the return on risky assets (which for convenience we call "equities", though which should be interpreted more widely). As we shall see the pace with which the switch from risky to safe financial assets happens is dependent upon the generosity of state pensions.
Overall households move into owner occupation early in the life cycle and only sell the house and move back to rented accommodation if they are still alive in their 80's.
The high average real rate of return on property, relatively high cost of renting and the existence of a bequest motive combine to make housing an attractive asset and one which people are content to dominate their portfolios of wealth for much of their lives. The savings rate in the economy starts at about 4.5% in 2000. This is very close to the UK net national savings rate in recent years which has been slightly above 4%.
It is the net national savings rate that corresponds to the household saving rate in this model because the government runs a balanced budget and implicit in the model is the assumption that corporations distribute their income -all savings is done by households.
The savings rate starts to decline gradually from about 2010, when it stands at close to 5%. By 2031 it is only just over 1% and only 0.8% by 2050. This change is largely driven by demographics: by 2050 there is a substantially higher proportion of retired households who have, on average, a lower savings rate than working households.
Scenario B: Constant contribution rate
In this scenario the value of the PAYGO pension declines gradually relative to average earnings. By 2050 the average replacement rate for newly retired households is down to 19%; in scenario A that ratio stays at 30%. This has a significant effect upon the evolution of the macroeconomic aggregates.
The impact on cohorts born later than 1960 is substantial. For example the cohort born in 1990, who start work in 2010, react to significantly lower state pensions by accumulating much more wealth by retirement. On average, the value of net worth of this cohort when it reaches retirement (at around 2050) is about 30% higher as a result of lower state pensions. Owner occupation is also markedly higher for this cohort than when state pensions are kept steady relative to incomes. Demand for financial assets is also greater. The proportionate impact of lower state pensions upon the value of residential property and financial assets held is similar, though demand for financial assets does grow by somewhat more.
As a result the macroeconomic aggregates in an environment of falling PAYGO pensions diverge quite markedly from those where the pension replacement rate is held constant. Figure 6 shows that with falling pensions the owner occupation rate is higher, as is the overall demand for housing; this drives house prices up somewhat faster than in the base case. (The owner occupation and saving rates are actually higher even at the start of the simulation period . This is because we assume in each scenario that agents anticipate the pension policy that is coming. The exact timing of when demand for housing and for financial assets rises under a scenario with falling replacement rates for state pensions will depend on when it becomes clear how policy is evolving). By 2050 the owner occupation is 77% when the pension is cut, but nearer to 72% when the replacement rate is constant. The reason is that falling state pensions substantially increase desired asset holdings among the population. Households are more willing to retain large net holdings of property into retirement. As a result the overall demand for housing is somewhat higher when the value of PAYGO pensions falls -house prices are about 8.5% higher by 2050. The relatively small impact on house prices -but larger impact upon the value of owner occupied residential property ( Figure 7 ) -reflects the fact that a switch from renting to buying (relative to the base case) itself is neutral for the overall demand for housing.
Net worth of the household sector relative to aggregate labour income is substantially higher, and rising, when the value of PAYGO pensions (relative to incomes) is set on a declining path. The overall saving rate is higher in scenario B for several years -in 2010 it Although the saving rate out of income is lower when retirement is significantly later, the overall accumulation of wealth (net worth) by cohorts who work longer is higher.
The fall in the rate of saving out of income is more than offset by the impact of higher lifetime labour income.
Portfolios of wealth and pension reform
The impact of different pension rules upon the structure of aggregate household balance sheets of assets is illustrated in Figures 9 to 11 . In all scenarios, aggregate gross financial assets rise relative to the value of owner occupied housing over time. This is because as households age and pay off their mortgage they accumulate financial assets and, if they live into their 80's and beyond, eventually tend to move out of owner occupation. In contrast younger households -particularly those in their 30's -hold the great majority of their wealth in the form of newly acquired homes and have relatively few financial assets.
Over time the proportion of households in the later stages of their lives, when financial assets rise in importance relative to housing, increases. But the scale of this aggregate portfolio shift varies depending on the state pension system. When state pensions become less generous (scenario B relative to scenario A) the switch towards financial assets in household portfolios over time is more marked. By 2050 financial assets comprise about 67% of gross assets in the economy relative to the base case (constant generosity of state pensions) of around 62%. But when the age at which households receive the state pension is significantly later (scenario C) the switch towards financial assets in gross wealth is slower than in the base case.
While we are able to say something fairly clear about the evolution of the demand for different types of assets under different pension systems it is harder to draw clear welfare conclusions. Figure 12 and Table 5 show that while in the long run a move towards less generous pay-as-you-go state pensions does increase average welfare for future generations, households who are middle aged (the cohorts born around 1960) tend to lose as the value of the state pension is scaled back. We are not able to find a Pareto improving change in the structure of state pensions. In a model where the average rate of return on assets is greater than the rate of growth of the economy it is not surprising that the long run impact of reducing the generosity of unfunded pensions is to raise average welfare. But nor is it surprising that on a transition there are likely to be losers (see Breyer 1989) . 
Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to explore the role of housing in a model of life cycle choices for UK households that face various forms of uncertainty, receive PAYGO pensions of various levels of generosity and have a limited bequest motive. Households also face borrowing constraints. We developed a model calibrated to reflect key features of the UK economy. We derived results on the behavior of cohorts over their life cycle and on the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates in an environment of rapidly changing demographics. We solved the model under various assumptions about how pensions and contribution rates will evolve.
We find that the demand for owner occupied housing is sensitive to demographic change and to reform of the PAYGO pension system. If PAYGO pension replacement rates remain high as the population ages the level of owner occupation may rise only marginally over time. But if pension generosity is scaled back sharply, the rate of owner occupation and directly held housing wealth may rise significantly faster. When the pension age is raised significantly the demand for housing rises most strongly and the demand for financial assets grows relatively less strongly. As a result there is a marked change in the aggregate pattern of household wealth relative to other pension scenarios.
But one thing all our scenarios have in common is that the importance of owner occupied property in overall portfolios declines over time. This is despite the fact that owner occupation rates continue to rise as do real house prices.
The links between the property market, demographic change and pension reform seem to be significant. The key policy conclusion from this paper is that the knock-on effect upon the housing market of demographic shifts and reform of the pension system is likely to be substantial. 
